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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Ann. (1992). This 
is an appeal from final judgment, dated May 27, 1992, of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
Notice of Appeal was filed June 16, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
DID THE PROSECUTOR VIOLATE HIS DISCOVERY OBLIGATION UNDER 
THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BY FAILING TO PROVIDE THE 
VIDEOTAPE TO THE DEFENSE IN A TIMELY MANNER? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There is no dispute as to the facts underlying this issue. 
Therefore, the question whether the prosecutor's actions violated 
Rule 16 of the rules of criminal procedure is a question of law. 
The trial court's conclusions of law are accorded no deference 
but are reviewed for correctness. Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 
790 (Utah 1990). 
ISSUE II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY ADMITTING THE VIDEOTAPE INTO 
EVIDENCE AND DID THIS ERROR PREJUDICE THE DEFENDANT'S CASE. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's denial of a request for relief under Rule 
16(g) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State 
v. Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913, 918-19 (Utah 1987). 
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STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 76-10-503. Possession of a dangerous weapon -- Persons 
not permitted to have -- Penalties. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony or 
is incarcerated in a correctional facility may not have in his 
possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon 
as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third 
degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, 
explosive, or infernal machine he is guilty of a second degree 
felony. 
Section 76-1-601. Definitions. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or representation of the 
item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item 
leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any 
other manner that he is in control of such an item. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose 
to the defense upon request the following material or information 
of which he has knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or 
codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced 
punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on 
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant 
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his 
defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing 
duty to make disclosure. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
PATRICK ARCHULETA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 920388-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Sixth 
Judicial District Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah. The 
defendant, Patrick Archuleta, was convicted of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (1992). (Transcript of Sentencing 
Proceeding, hereinafter "Tr." at 221-22.) Defendant appeals the 
conviction on the grounds that the trial court improperly 
admitted a videotape into evidence and allowed it to be shown to 
the jury. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The incident which gave rise to the charge occurred November 
9, 1991 at the Central Utah Correctional Facility. Patrick 
Archuleta and another inmate refused to return to their cells and 
were involved in a disturbance which lasted between an hour and a 
half and two hours. (Tr. at 71-100.) Prison security personnel 
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recorded the incident on a video camera. (Tr. at 163.) 
On February 14, 1992, Defense Counsel filed a request for 
discovery which specifically requested the videotape. (Tr. at 
158.) The tape was not delivered to Defense Counsel until 
Tuesday, May 5, 1992. (Tr. at 159.) Furthermore, the defendant 
was not allowed to view the videotape until 9:00 p.m. on 
Saturday, May 9, 1992--only 3 6 hours before the trial began. 
(Tr. at 158.) This left the defense with insufficient time to 
prepare to counter the videotape at trial. 
At trial, which was held on Monday, May 11, 1992, the 
prosecution offered the videotape into evidence. (Tr. at 157.) 
The defense objected for two reasons. One objection was that the 
videotape had not been provided as requested in the discovery 
request. The other objection was that the portion of the tape 
which was to be shown to the jury had a seven minute gap. (Tr. 
at 157-60.) The trial court admitted the tape over the 
objection. (Tr. at 161.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROSECUTOR IN THIS CASE VIOLATED HIS DISCOVERY OBLIGATION 
BY FAILING TO PROVIDE THE VIDEO TAPE TO THE DEFENSE IN A TIMELY 
MANNER. 
The prosecutor's failure to comply with the defendant's 
motion for discovery in this case violated the rules of criminal 
procedure and impaired the adversary process. The videotape at 
issue is a recorded statement of the defendant which, under the 
rules of criminal procedure, must be disclosed by the prosecutor 
upon request. Furthermore, when the prosecution chooses to 
respond voluntarily to a discovery request without requiring the 
defense to obtain a court order, fairness requires that the 
prosecution must respond to the request in a manner that will not 
be misleading and must produce all of the material requested or 
identify explicitly those materials that will not be provided. 
The prosecutor's delay in this case denied the defendant and 
his counsel the opportunity to discuss the contents of the tape 
and prepare to counter the evidence. In fact, the defense could 
have reasonably assumed that the videotape would not be offered 
into evidence because it had not been delivered in response to 
the discovery request. The prosecution must comply when a 
request for discovery is made. This ensures that the trial is a 
real quest for truth and not simply a contest between the parties 
to win. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE VIDEOTAPE AND THIS 
ERROR PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT'S CASE 
When the trial court learned that the prosecution had failed 
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to comply with the criminal discovery rule, it could have 
prohibited introduction of the evidence not disclosed or it could 
have taken other remedial measures to mitigate any prejudice to 
the defendant. The trial court's failure to exclude the 
videotape or to take any other remedial measures constitutes an 
abuse of discretion warranting reversal. It is likely that the 
remedial measures requested but refused would have led to a more 
favorable result for the defendant. 
In the case at the bar the defense was impaired by the 
prosecutor's failure to provide the tape within a reasonable time 
before trial. The defense did not have adequate time to prepare 
to rebut or explain the information presented in the tape. In 
cases involving a wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory 
evidence, the burden is on the State to persuade the appellate 
court that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense. The 
State cannot meet that burden in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTOR IN THIS CASE VIOLATED HIS DISCOVERY OBLIGATION BY 
FAILING TO PROVIDE THE VIDEO TAPE TO THE DEFENSE IN A TIMELY 
MANNER. 
The prosecutor's failure to comply with the defendant's 
motion for discovery in this case violated the rules of criminal 
procedure and impaired the adversary process. According to Rule 
16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure the prosecutor has an 
obligation to comply with the defendant's motion for discovery. 
The rule states in the pertinent part: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request the following 
material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or co-defendants; 
(2) The criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-
defendant; 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of 
the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense 
for reduced punishment; 
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court 
determines on good cause shown should be made available 
to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a) (emphasis added). 
The material requested in this case is covered by the 
description in subsection (a)(1). The defense moved for 
discovery of a videotape, made by prison officials, of the 
disturbance which occurred at the prison. Because the videotape 
recorded the actions of the defendant and was proffered to 
support the contention that he had possession of a dangerous 
weapon, it is a "relevant . . . recorded statement of the 
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defendant." Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1). Rule 16 mandates that 
the prosecutor disclose this recorded statement upon request. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a). 
If the requested videotape is not covered by subsection 
(a)(1), it is covered by the catch-all provision, subsection 
(a)(5). Although the catch-all provision requires disclosure 
only to the extent ordered by the court, the Utah Supreme Court 
has ruled that "when the prosecution chooses to respond 
voluntarily to a request under subsection (a)(5) without 
requiring the defense to obtain a court order, considerations of 
fairness require that the prosecution respond to the request in a 
manner that will not be misleading." State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 
913, 916 (Utah 1987). One of the requirements imposed when the 
prosecution voluntarily responds to a subsection (a)(5) request 
is that "the prosecution must produce all of the material 
requested or must identify explicitly those portions of the 
request with respect to which no responsive material will be 
provided." Id. at 916-17. Therefore, regardless of whether the 
videotape is classified as a relevant recorded statement or as 
other evidence under the catch-all provision, the prosecutor had 
a duty to comply with the discovery request and disclose the 
requested materials by providing the videotape to the defendant. 
When responding to a discovery request, the prosecutor is 
required to "make all disclosures as soon as practicable 
following the filing of charges and before the defendant is 
required to plead." Utah R. Crim. P. 16(b). It is clear from 
11 
the record that the prosector failed to meet his discovery 
obligation in a timely manner. The videotape was requested by 
defense counsel on February 14, 1992 but was not delivered until 
Tuesday, May 5, 1992. (Tr. at 158-59.) The unfairness of the 
situation is compounded by the fact that the defendant, who was 
incarcerated at the state prison, was not allowed to view the 
tape until 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, May 9, 1992--only thirty-six 
hours before the trial began. (Tr. at 158.) The defendant had 
virtually no opportunity to confer with his attorney about the 
contents of the tape and thus the defense was denied sufficient 
time to explore ways of countering the tape. The Utah Supreme 
Court commented on a similar situation stating, "[s]ince defense 
counsel only had one evening and a lunch break to prepare to meet 
the . . . testimony, we are not persuaded that defense was as 
effective as is would have been if defense counsel had been 
granted a continuance to meet the undisclosed evidence." State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 922 (Utah 1987). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE VIDEOTAPE AND THIS ERROR 
PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT'S CASE. 
When the trial court learns that a party has failed to 
comply with the criminal discovery rule, it may prohibit the 
party from introducing the evidence not disclosed. Utah R. Crim. 
P. 16(g). The trial court has ample discretion to obviate or 
remedy any prejudice to the defendant resulting from a breach of 
Rule 16. State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah 1987). In the case at bar the 
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trial court admitted the videotape into evidence over the 
defendant's objection even though the prosecutor had not complied 
with the criminal discovery rules. The trial court's failure to 
exclude the videotape or to take any other remedial measures 
constitutes an abuse of discretion warranting reversal because 
"the prejudice to the defendant satisfies the standard for 
reversible error set forth in Rule 30, and the remedial measures 
requested but refused would have obviated this prejudice." 
Knight. 734 P.2d at 918. 
Rule 30 provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party 
shall be disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). The Utah Supreme 
Court has ruled that "the phrase 'affect the substantial rights 
of a party' means that an error warrants reversal only if a 
review of the record persuades the court that without the error 
there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for 
the defendant." Knight, 734 P.2d at 919 (citations omitted). 
In State v. Knight, the Utah Supreme Court carefully 
analyzed the meaning of the "reasonable likelihood" standard. 
Id. at 919-21. The court concluded that "for an error to require 
reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." Id. 
at 920. The court explained further that when considered against 
"a spectrum of probabilities" where "a 'mere possibility' [of a 
different result] is at the low end of the spectrum, 'near 
certainty' is at the high end, and 'more probable than not' is a 
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likelihood greater than fifty percent", the likelihood of a 
different result which would undermine confidence in the verdict 
"is certainly above the 'mere possibility' point on the spectrum" 
but is "at some point substantially short of the 'more probable 
than not' portion of the spectrum." Id. 
Additionally, the court held that "in cases involving a 
wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence, it seems 
appropriate . . . to place the burden on the State to persuade a 
court that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense." 
Id. at 921. The burden is placed on the State because when the 
prosecution fails to disclose inculpatory evidence, the record is 
silent as to the "nature and magnitude of the resulting prejudice 
to the defense." Id. at 920. The court stated: 
The record cannot reveal how knowledge of this evidence 
would have affected the actions of the defense counsel, 
either in preparing for trial or in presenting the case 
to the jury. To a large extent, this leaves the 
reviewing court to speculate whether, absent the error 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the defense would 
have adduced other evidence which, when considered in 
light of the evidence actually presented, would have 
produced a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
guilt. 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 920. 
In the case at the bar the defense was impaired by the 
Prosecutor's failure to provide the tape within a reasonable time 
before trial. The defense did not have adequate time to prepare 
to rebut or explain the information presented in the tape. If 
defense counsel had been able to converse with the defendant 
about the contents of the tape they may have discovered and 
emphasized inconsistencies between the tape and the guards' 
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testimony. 
For example, the tape apparently recorded none of the 
threats to which the guards testified. (Tr. at 175). One of the 
key issues in this case was whether the broomstick, which was 
issued to the prisoners by the prison authorities, was a 
dangerous weapon. (Tr. at 93-97, 111-14, 152-53.) A dangerous 
weapon is defined as "any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury . . . and the actor's use or apparent 
intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe 
the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (1992). With adequate time to 
prepare and review the contents of the tape the defense may well 
have persuaded the jury that the broomstick was not a dangerous 
weapon. 
A trial should be a real quest for the truth and not simply 
a contest between the parties to win. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 
663 (Utah 1985). The fairness and integrity of this trial were 
tainted because the prosecutor chose to withhold evidence from 
the defense. Even if the defense knew that the videotape 
existed, it could reasonably have concluded that the tape was not 
going to be used at trial because the prosecutor was so late 
complying with the discovery request. Furthermore, it seems 
inherently misleading that the portion of the tape shown to the 
jury had a seven minute gap. It is reasonably likely that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different if the videotape 
was excluded or if the trial court had taken other remedial 
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measures to mitigate prosecutor's delinquent disclosure of the 
evidence. 
The conviction must be reversed. The admission of the 
videotape into evidence has so eroded the integrity of the trial 
that the outcome merits no confidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecutor violated his discovery obligation when he 
failed to provide the videotape to the defense in a timely 
manner. Because the prosecutor violated the rules of criminal 
procedure, the trial court erred when it admitted the videotape 
into evidence despite an objection by the defense. The 
conviction must be reversed because it is likely that the outcome 
of the trial would have been different if the videotape had been 
excluded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Paul R. Frischknecht 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 7 6-10 5C ' .-.-•-MM. . rsons 
not permitted tc , ~ -u:;a.! 
(2) (a) Any person A.I J S • . paioK* .,i p : ,OciM ^ . for a L t=. ..u> -r 
is incarcerated in a correcti.K.u facility may not have in his 
possession or under his custody ^r centre" any dangerous wea^ :. 
as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this sect, or: i.s guilty of a third 
degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is i firearm 
explosive, or infernal marhinp Y>& -i ~- -r;:" — •• sec. ;id degree 
felony. 
Section 7 6-1-601. i 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable cf causing deatn or 
serious bodily i njury, or a facsvmi"!- epresentat \ ?:: 
item, and: 
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended *se c* "h- item 
leads the victim to reasonably believe the iten, - . i-- \r ^^ 
cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
b; the actor represents to the victim verbal!/ r ..:
 2 
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OF' CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
<- - . - discovery. ., ,; 
ia, except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose 
ro the defense upon request the following m a t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ rfnvT.at:: "^  
.'r wt: -:h he has knowledge: 
\1) relevant written or recorded statements ui . :.* 
defendant or codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; ' 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or 
codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecute: that tends tv. ne^a^: 
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degrpp -r- - '*•-- - "f^n?-^ f- - _ . • . 
punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on 
good cause shown should be made available to the defendant 
in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his 
defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead,. The proseci itor has a continuing 
du t y t o ma k e d i s c 1 o s u r e 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceeding it is 
brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to 
comply wit! this rule, the court may order such party to permit 
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the 
party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter 
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
Rule 5 0, Errors and defects• 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not 
affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of 
the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or 
omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such 
notice, it any, as the court may order. 
